Experts suggest looking for the answer in the foreign policy model of “Georgian Dream” (the ruling party). Despite legislative alignment with the Russian Federation, the government continues to play an “ambiguous game” in the West.
Last week, US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Sonata Coulter visited the country, where she also met with the opposition. Prior to this, in late March, the first long-awaited telephone conversation took place between Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze and Secretary of State Marco Rubio. This was preceded by prolonged attempts by official Tbilisi to establish contact with the new US administration. Notably, “Dream” has drawn a clear line between the Trump and Biden administrations from the very beginning. All criticism directed at the US was reserved for the latter.
Around the same time as Coulter’s visit, another important guest arrived in Georgia: Kevin Hamilton, the new NATO Secretary General’s Special Representative for the Caucasus and Central Asia. During this period, relations with the Alliance have followed two parallel tracks. On one hand, practical cooperation has been maintained. In May 2025, for instance, major joint exercises were held, and the Georgian army continues its transition to Western standards in communications and medicine. On the other hand, there is a political “chill.” In his latest annual report, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte officially confirmed that while military cooperation continues, political rapprochement has been put on hold until rule-of-law requirements are met.
Also last week—specifically on May 4—the first conversation in a long time took place between the Georgian Prime Minister and the Ukrainian President on the sidelines of the European Political Community summit in Yerevan. The initiative came from Kyiv. A meeting at the level of foreign ministers has been announced for May 14-15 in Moldova. Interestingly, “Georgian Dream” has also followed a principle of dualism regarding Ukraine. Despite harsh criticism, open accusations of attempts to destabilize Georgia, and a refusal to join international economic sanctions against Russia, Tbilisi has continued to provide humanitarian aid to Ukraine. Last October, for example, the government allocated over half a million dollars for the purchase of a new batch of generators of various capacities. Recently, the financial assistance and free medical care program for Ukrainian refugees was extended once again.
In the context of Brussels, Tbilisi also adheres to a “selective” strategy. Despite harsh criticism of the European Union and the suspension of the European integration process, the party continued to announce its intention to join the Union. In 2025, Georgia’s level of alignment with EU foreign policy dropped to 40%, and the country rejected all economic sanction packages against Moscow. Nevertheless, it joined political declarations condemning Russian aggression, recognizing Ukraine’s 1991 borders, and calling for compliance with international humanitarian law.
According to observers, “Dream” used this ambiguity to build a line of defense against accusations of being fully pro-Russian while maintaining room for maneuver. It is possible that the detention of five security officials—three of whom are former officers—is precisely such a maneuver.