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The Carrot, the Stick, and the Deadlock: How Moscow is Finishing Off Abkhazia

1920 1080 thumb 1 The Age of Blurred Landmarks

Relations between Russia and the self-proclaimed republic of Abkhazia are developing on a carrot-and-stick basis. Moscow is still searching for ways to reap dividends from the multi-billion financial injections it has poured into the occupied region since the early 1990s. Yet, the Abkhazians are showing enviable flexibility. On the one hand, the region is totally dependent on Moscow — politically and economically. On the other, they are in no hurry to throw themselves fully into Russia’s embrace.

A toxic relationship or a bromance? What is happening between Moscow and Sukhumi — we break it down in this new episode of The Era of Blurred Reference Points.

My name is Marta Ardashelia, and you know what to do to support independent journalism. All the links are in the description.

Let’s quickly run through the latest key events in Russian-Abkhaz relations.

In 2022, a fierce debate erupted in the region over the state dacha in Pitsunda. Initially, it had been leased to Russia under an agreement from 1995, meaning the territory formally remained under Sukhumi’s control. However, in 2022, Russia demanded ownership of the dacha. After nearly a year of public protests and fierce polemics, the de facto parliament approved and ratified the agreement on the dacha. Yet, in ratifying the document, the Abkhaz parliament supplemented it with a separate law stating that the state dacha cannot be transferred to third parties in the future. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has repeatedly sent diplomatic notes on this matter to the de facto Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Abkhazia.

Another law that became a bone of contention between Moscow and Sukhumi is the law on foreign influence. The Kremlin strongly advised Abkhazia to “harmonize” its legislation with that of the Russian Federation. Abkhaz activists, NGOs, and journalists viewed its adoption as a threat to freedoms, restricting criticism of the authorities and citizens’ rights. As a result, the law was not passed: discussions in parliament were repeatedly postponed, and hearings never actually began.

As for the law allowing foreigners to buy or build real estate — the so-called “apartment law” in Abkhazia — this highly controversial initiative has been discussed repeatedly, but the issue remains unresolved.

What was Russia’s response? — A cold winter. Energy blackmail became the primary lever of pressure on the region’s rebellious residents.

Perhaps the Kremlin realized that the relationship needed a reset, and following high-profile protests in Sukhumi in the autumn of 2024, the de facto President Bzhania resigned. Abkhazia is now led by a new Kremlin protégé, Badra Gunba. And it seems the era of the carrot has arrived.

The reconstruction of the road in the Kodori Gorge, uninterrupted electricity supplies, and Ochamchire — with its renovated seaport and container terminals — which has turned into a permanent base for the Russian Navy. There are also cultural and educational projects. But the icing on the cake was the reopening of the Sukhumi Airport this May.

Another concession for the residents of Abkhazia came in the form of a decree by Putin. Russian citizens living in Abkhazia are now allowed to obtain or renew their passports directly within the region. This means that Russia has already erased even the formal border that the Abkhazians hold onto so dearly.

Nevertheless, things are not entirely straightforward for Russia in Sukhumi. The Kremlin has apparently decided to exert control through additional internal actors. For instance, during the local elections on November 8, the opposition identified Russian citizens who were advising the “Team Abkhazia” (Komanda Abkhazii) political force. The incident caused a major scandal, but I see another important aspect to this: Russia understands that multi-billion subsidies do not buy public opinion in Abkhazia on the most critical issues.

Perhaps Russia even feels duped. But that is likely only in the short term. In the long game, where the Kremlin is quite strong, Abkhazia is losing its language and identity, with new generations growing up sharing common values with Russia. As a result, Abkhazia risks ending up with new generations who not only do not speak their own language, but also see no danger in passing the apartment law, risking getting lost among hundreds of thousands of new owners of this Georgian land.



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