Georgia’s main theater stage has become a platform for Russian “soft power.” That’s how critics are commenting on the event titled “Songs of the War Years,” which took place at the Shota Rustaveli Theater in Tbilisi. Officially, the organizers merely rented the venue, but the performance of Soviet wartime repertoire became yet another example of how the memory of the war is being used to advance Kremlin narratives.
On May 14, an evening dedicated to the 81st anniversary of Victory in the Great Patriotic War was held in Tbilisi. Students from the Russian Institute of Theatre Arts (GITIS) performed on the small stage of the Rustaveli Theatre. The event was organized by the Russian Interests Section at the Embassy of Switzerland and the “Azbuka” (Alphabet) Cultural Center.
The event’s program was built around Soviet-era wartime repertoire: “Katyusha”, “Tyomnaya Noch” (Dark Night), and poems by Simonov and Tvardovsky were performed on stage. The Russian Interests Section stated that the concert was “a great success.”
“The guests of the evening—representatives of the diplomatic corps, business and scientific communities, public and cultural organizations, as well as Russian compatriots—accompanied every performance with applause.”
The diplomatic mission also added that “the sacred poetic memories of the heroic pages of our shared history, of the Great Patriotic War, will forever remain in the hearts of the peoples of Russia and Georgia.”
The following day, May 15, the play “The Days of the Turbins” was performed on the same Rustaveli stage. The announcement of the production specifically noted that Mikhail Bulgakov’s play was “Stalin’s favorite play.”
“We bore a great responsibility, a kind of mission—important and very exciting. Both the concert dedicated to Victory Day and the play ‘The Days of the Turbins’ went wonderfully—the audience gave standing ovations both times. I hope that in the future our artists will visit this beautiful land more often,” said Valeria Lanskaya, course master of the Musical Theatre Faculty at GITIS.
Meanwhile, videos and photos from the events went viral in the Georgian segment of social media, sparking a wave of criticism from a section of society. Opposition media and activist pages began accusing the theater management and the Ministry of Culture of aiding Russian propaganda and warning of the threat of the Kremlin’s cultural expansion. A comment by one of the evening’s participants, student Daniil Korneev, added fuel to the fire. He said they were welcomed in Tbilisi like family:
“It’s as if this isn’t another country, not some other city, as if we never really left, actually. As if we have always been here and as if we always will be.”
The Rustaveli Theatre stated that they view the matter solely through the prism of business relations and even from a somewhat mercantile perspective. In a comment to TV Pirveli, director Gia Tevzadze said that the theater had merely rented out the hall and received the maximum possible amount for it. He saw nothing unacceptable in the productions:
“We rented out the hall, took the maximum amount, there was nothing of the sort there, they were GITIS students. Did we not lose anyone in that war? We lost the most in that war. Of course, if they need it again, we will rent out the theater hall again—for the money.”
The Ministry of Culture distanced itself from the scandal, stating that the Rustaveli Theatre is a legal entity under public law and operates independently in accordance with the procedures established by Georgian legislation. In response to a question from Radio Liberty, the ministry repeated Gia Tevzadze’s point that the Rustaveli Theatre stage was simply rented out.
However, Tamta Mikeladze, director of the Social Justice Center, does not view the incident as a harmless technical matter. She questions whether Georgian society should so directly adopt the wartime experience as presented in the Kremlin’s official narrative. According to the human rights activist, Putin’s regime actively uses the triumph in World War II as a tool for political legitimization, imperial influence, and justifying the invasion of Ukraine.
“In Putin’s Russia, the discourse on World War II no longer functions as a complex and tragic historical experience. It has turned into a state cult, where victory is presented as proof of Russia’s special civilizational mission, and critical reflection is almost equated with treason. The cult of the ‘Great Victory’ in modern Russia serves not only to remember the past but also to maintain constant military mobilization and imperial identity.”
Mikeladze emphasizes that the concept of the Great Patriotic War has ceased to be merely a matter of historical memory and has become a central element of modern Russian state ideology. She also notes that the performance took place specifically at the Rustaveli Theatre, which represents one of the “most important sites of Georgian cultural memory,” and one “directly linked to the experience of Soviet terror and repression.”
At the same time, Russia uses the idea of a “shared history” to spread its influence. Such phrases are not neutral cultural language, Mikeladze insists. They are part of a policy of imperial memory, where Russia is still presented as the historical center, and post-Soviet societies as a single “civilizational space.”
“In such narratives, the history of occupation, Soviet terror, forced Russification, and colonial experience disappears.”
Tamta Mikeladze also adds that memory of World War II is important in itself—it was a difficult experience for the Georgian people, “and it needs to be seen, studied, and its trauma and sacrifices acknowledged”—but its Kremlin-driven, colonial political instrumentalization is problematic.
GITIS, which arrived in Tbilisi on tour, often serves as a platform for implementing Russian state cultural and ideological policies. The university’s leadership openly supports the Kremlin’s military actions and state narratives, and the institute itself organizes various initiatives within the framework of official ideology.
Rector Grigory Zaslavsky regularly speaks out in support of the authorities. He was among the representatives of the academic sphere who supported Moscow’s recognition of the DPR and LPR (Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics).
At the same time, the website of one of Russia’s key theater universities emphasizes not only its educational function but also its international mission: GITIS organizes festivals, laboratories, masterclasses, exhibitions, theater performances, and other projects abroad.
Following the start of the full-scale war in Ukraine, the institute’s international activities began shifting toward countries with which Moscow maintains humanitarian and political channels of communication. In recent years, projects have been implemented in Central Asia, Latin America, China, India, Tunisia, Egypt, Zambia, Senegal, and elsewhere. The university states that “GITIS is ready to play its role in international cultural diplomacy.”
At the same time, the Russian Institute of Theatre Arts is increasingly appearing in connection with Kremlin public diplomacy structures—foundations, “Russian Houses”, Rossotrudnichestvo (Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States Affairs, Compatriots Residing Abroad, and International Humanitarian Cooperation), and programs that promote Russian education and culture abroad.
However, critics warn that under the guise of cultural evenings and plays, the organizers are replicating propaganda clichés. The Gorchakov Fund (Alexander Gorchakov Public Diplomacy Fund), created in 2010 by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs under a decree by President Medvedev, openly admits that GITIS serves as one of the instruments of Russia’s “soft power.”
